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Abstract
Within linguistic semantics, it is near orthodoxy that the function of the
word ‘if’ (in most cases) is to mark restrictions on quantification. Despite its
linguistic prominence, this view of the word ‘if’ has played little role in the
philosophical discussion of conditionals. This paper tries to fill in this gap by
systematically discussing the impact of the restrictor view on the competing
philosophical views of conditionals. I argue that most philosophical views can
and should be understood in a way that is compatible with the restrictor view,
but that accepting the restrictor allows for new responses to some prominent
arguments for non-truth-conditional account of conditionals.
Introduction
Within linguistic semantics, it is near orthodoxy that the function of the word ‘if’
(in most cases) is to mark restrictions on quantification. Just as in the sentence
‘Every man smokes’, the common noun ‘man’ restricts the quantifier ‘every’, in the
sentence ‘Usually, if it’s winter it’s cold’, ‘it’s winter’ acts as a restrictor on the
situational quantifier ‘usually’. This view, originally due to Lewis (1975), has been
greatly extended in work by Heim (1982) and, most notably, Kratzer (1978, 1981,
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1986, 2012) into a rich theory of almost all uses of the word ‘if’. I call this the
restrictor view of ‘if’.
Despite its linguistic prominence, this view of the word ‘if’ has played little role in
the philosophical discussion of conditionals. Fairly recent philosophical surveys such
as Bennett’s (2003) book-length introduction or Edgington’s (1995; 2008) review
articles do not even mention the restrictor view. Stranger still, in his seminal work
on conditionals and probability, Lewis (1976, 1986) does not discuss the restrictor
view that he pioneered, despite the intimate relation noted by Kratzer (1978, 1986).1
This paper tries to fill in the gap left by these omissions.2
I make four main points. First, I argue that given the current state of affairs our
best bet is to accept the ‘restrictor view’ and to assume that ‘if’ is not ambiguous, so
that we should accept some variant of the full Heim/Kratzer account of conditionals.
Second, I argue that the restrictor view is compatible with all major philosophical
views of conditionals, if they are understood in the right way, namely as theories
about the meaning of certain sentences that include ‘if’, rather than as theories
about the meaning of the word ‘if’ itself. Third, I argue that the restrictor view
undermines an important argument from the probabilities of conditionals to a non-
propositional view of conditionals (an argument which Lewis played a large role in
developing). Fourth, I argue that consideration of embeddings of conditionals, while
not decisive, provide some evidence for a combination of the restrictor view with
the view that indicative conditionals express propositions.
Not all these points are completely novel, but I think together they paint an
important picture of the current state of our understanding of conditionals, one
which is not easily found elsewhere.
1It seems to me that Lewis must have thought ‘if’ was three-ways ambiguous: it acts as a pure
restrictor under adverbs of quantification (Lewis, 1975), it is the material conditional in cases
of indicative conditionals (Lewis, 1976), and it is a variably strict conditional in counterfactuals
(Lewis, 1973).
2Many of the points made here expand on observations in Kratzer’s own work, unpublished
lectures by von Fintel (1994a), as well as Cozic and E´gre´ (2010), and Rothschild (2013).
2
Conditionals and Semantic Theory
When linguists and philosophers discuss conditionals they are mostly talking about
sentences that include the word ‘if’, such as these:
(1) If a man comes in, he’ll be angry.
(2) Usually, if a man comes in, he’ll be angry.
(3) If a man comes in, he’ll probably be angry.
Philosophers often discuss rival theories of conditionals: the material conditional
(e.g. Grice, 1967/1989; Jackson, 1987), the Stalnaker conditional (e.g. Stalnaker,
1968), the (related) strict and variably strict conditionals (e.g. Lewis, 1973; Ellis,
1978), the non-propositional theories (e.g. Adams, 1975; Edgington, 1995). In order
to assess how these views relate to the restrictor view, we need to relate these
theories to semantics generally.
For this reason I’ll say a bit here about the structure of semantic theory. Se-
mantics aims at a systematic account of the meaning of sentences in terms of the
meaning of their parts and how they are put together. This typically involves assign-
ing meanings to words (lexical items) and specifying rules of semantic composition
(i.e. rules that get you from syntactic structures with meaningful components to the
meanings of the whole structures). In combination, then, we can assign meanings to
entire sentences. In the case of a complete declarative sentence, a standard semantic
theory will assign a proposition to it, in particular the proposition that the sentence
expresses.3
Empirically this enterprise is constrained by what propositions sentences actually
express, as revealed by such things as our truth-value judgments of sentences in
different situations, our judgments of entailment and so on. Further constraints
3Of course doing so will often rely on using contextual information. I’m abstracting away from
this here, as I don’t think it’s relevant to the particular points I am making.
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Figure 1: Structure of semantic theory for declaratives
on the project come through the related concerns of simplicity and learnability.
These concerns push for simple, clear rules of composition and simple, unambiguous
meanings assigned to lexical items. Of course, there is ambiguity and complexity
in language but we aim to build simple theories to capture these complexities. In
addition, of course, the actual syntactic structure of sentences will constrain our
theorizing as it is this structure that the composition rules need to work with.4
Semantics connects to the more personal-level notions of communication and
belief mostly by way of the semantic values of entire sentences.5 Figure 1 shows the
structure of the situation: assertive content and conditions of belief only connect to
word-meaning via sentence meaning. The way in which sentential semantic values
connect up to assertion and belief is mostly simple and familiar: If our semantic
theory assigns a proposition p to a sentence S, then an assertive utterance of S is
an assertion of p. Likewise, believing S is true amounts to believing p is true.6
4Constraints like compositionality, which are motivated by concerns of simplicity and learn-
ability, provide particularly sharp constraints on which theories are acceptable for given syntactic
structures.
5Of course, there are also the more elusive, sub-sentential speech-act notions of reference and
predication that might constrain our semantic theorizing.
6I am putting issues of context dependence aside here.
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It is important to note that even orthodox semantic theories do not always
work by assigning propositions to sentences. Semantic theories typically do not as-
sign propositions to ‘wh’-questions—e.g. ‘Who came?’, ‘Where is Kate?’— as their
meaning. Rather the semantic values assigned to wh-questions tend to be sets of
propositions or partitions of logical space (Hamblin, 1973; Karttunen, 1977; Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof, 1984). That is because the speech act of questioning does
not amount to the assertion of a proposition, but something more like a request for
information.
In all cases, we implicitly or explicitly use bridging principles that connect up
semantic values with the personal-level acts and states associated with the sentences
(e.g. assertion and belief in the case of normal indicative sentences, asking and
wondering in the case of questions). In the case of declarative sentences these
bridging principles, evoked implicitly above, are trivial, i.e. if a sentence S has the
semantic value p then an assertive utterance of S is an assertion of the proposition
p.7 In figure 1, the bridging principles are what connect the sentential semantic value
to the assertive content and the conditions of belief; semantic theory, by contrast,
takes us from word meaning and syntactic structure to sentential semantic value.
The point of this sketch of the semantic theory is to illustrate the number of dif-
ferent levels at which claims about conditionals can be understood. I will argue here
that the most charitable interpretation of philosophical theories of conditionals is
as claims about a) the semantic values of entire sentences that include conditionals,
and b) what it is to assert/know/wonder about those sentences, i.e. how we should
understand the speech-acts and psychological states associated with conditional sen-
tences. My main claim is negative: philosophical theories of conditionals should not
be viewed as direct claims about the meaning of the word ‘if’ and the compositional
rules that govern sentences with ‘if’. In terms of figure 1 philosophical theories only
7Except to the extent that semantic values of declarative sentences might be index-dependent
as argued by Lewis (1980). See also Stanley (2002), Ninan (2010) and Rabern (2012).
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cover the middle and the bottom sections of the picture. Thus, philosophers should
not be seen as giving semantic theories of ‘if’ in the usual sense.
This claim may be surprising. After all, philosophical theories of conditionals
tend to come as complete packages: theories of the meaning of the connective ‘if’,
the meaning of entire sentences that include ‘if’, what is asserted by sentences that
include ‘if’, and what it is to believe such sentences. Indeed, theories are often clas-
sified according to their view of the connective ‘if’: hook (the material conditional),
the Stalnaker conditional, the strict conditional, etc (as in Edgington, 2008).
My claim about how to best understand philosophical theories of conditionals
does not, however, rest on the intentions of those propounding the theories. Rather
it relies on the principle of charity: philosophical theories of conditionals are most
plausible if understood at the higher level.
Conditionals and Adverbs of Quantification
Here I will sketch Lewis (1975), Kratzer (1978, 1981, 1986), and Heim’s (1982) view
that ‘if’ is a device for marking the restriction of a quantifier. I believe this is one of
the best established claims in semantic theory due to it simplicity and explanatory
power. Lewis, in ‘Adverbs of quantification’, considered sentences like (4), where,
intuitively, a conditional is embedded under an adverb of quantification.
(4) Usually, if Mary is here, she is angry.
It seems reasonable to assume here that ‘usually’ functions as a quantifier over times
or situations.8 In this case both ‘Mary is here’ and ‘she is angry’ will be true or
8In fact, Lewis rejects the general claim that adverbs of quantification are always situation
quantifiers. He argues instead that they are unselective quantifiers that can quantify over any
free variable. However, this aspect of Lewis’s theory is not generally accepted. In cases like (4),
anyway, even Lewis would presumably think the right analysis has the ‘usually’ bind a time, event,
or situation variable. I will assume in this note, following von Fintel (1994b, 1995), that adverbs of
quantification always bind situation variables, though nothing essential rides on this assumption.
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false relative to different times or situations. This leaves the question of what the
meaning of the conditional connective ‘if’ is in this case. We might think, as is
standard in logic, that it is a connective that joins together the sentences ‘Mary
is here’ and ‘she is angry’ to produce some complex sentence which itself is true
relative to different situations. Lewis argued that this is not the right way to think
about examples like (4). Rather, Lewis suggested, the entire ‘if’-clause, ‘if Mary is
here’, acts as a restrictor on the the quantification over times or situations. So we
can paraphrase (4) as follows:9
(5) Most situations in which Mary is here are situations in which she is angry.
Thus, the function of ‘if’ in sentences like (4) is simply to mark the fact that ‘Mary
is here’ is a restrictor of the situational quantifier ‘usually’. More explicitly: we
think of all situational quantifiers, such as ‘usually’, as binary quantifiers that take
both a restrictor and a matrix predicate.10 The semantic contribution of ‘if’ is to
mark the fact that the material following it serves as part of the restrictor. The
other material, what we traditionally call the consequent, goes into the matrix.
We can write a binary quantifier Q acting on the restrictor φ and the matrix ψ
as Q[φ][ψ]. Thus (4) has the schematic form in (6):
(6) Usually[Mary is here][Mary is angry].
To my knowledge there is no serious rival theory to Lewis’s account of the role of
‘if’-clauses under adverbs of quantification.11 As Lewis points out, it follows from
9I am putting aside here the various difficulties in counting situations which affect the interpre-
tation of (5). See von Fintel (1997/2005); Kratzer (2011).
10Unary quantifiers like ∀x and ∃x take a single open-formula, e.g. Fx. A binary quantifier,
such as mostx takes two open-formulas, e.g. Fx and Gx, one of which is called the restrictor the
other a matrix. For example, in the sentence ‘Most men are tall’, ‘man’ is the restrictor predicate
and ‘is tall’ is the matrix predicate. See, e.g., Barwise and Cooper (1981) for further discussion.
11I consider Belnap’s (1970) trivalent account of conditionals under quantifiers as one particular
implementation of the restrictor view. Of course, if one does not have such a catholic view, then
this would be a ‘rival’ to the restrictor view. There seems little point in quibbling about this issue.
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well-known results on binary quantification that no truth-functional conditional con-
nective can predict the same truth conditions.12 There are also no extant, plausible
non-truth-functional accounts of conditional propositions that capture this equiva-
lence.13
A technical note: As we will see, the restrictor view admits of many implemen-
tations within specific semantic frameworks. One possible view, adopted by Heim
(1982) and Kratzer (1978) gives a syntactic spin to the view. Quantifiers, generally,
are seen as having two arguments. Whether a given piece of syntactic material occu-
pies one argument place or the other is a syntactic matter, and ‘if’ serves a syntactic
marker that what follows it is in the restrictor argument place. On this syntactic
spin ‘if’ has no semantic value whatsoever, it merely serves to mark a syntactic place
for the material after it. (I give a simple version of this syntactic story in the first
appendix.) This is by no means the only view we can have and it does not fit well
with current syntactic theory. We can also think that ‘if’ takes the material inside
it and returns a function that modifies quantifiers by restricting them with that
material. In this case, ‘if’ has a very specific meaning, it takes as input a sentence
and returns something that can modify quantifiers or their parameters (Kratzer,
1981, 2012). This view fits well with the idea that ‘if’-clauses are adverbial phrases
(Geis, 1970). There are other possible views which we can think of as versions of
the restrictor view, such as Belnap’s (1970) trivalent view, which I will discuss later.
Which view you want will depend, mostly, on a lot of detailed questions about your
overall syntactic and semantic framework, and I don’t think those questions much
affect my discussion here.
12See Barwise and Cooper (1981) for discussion of this result which was originally proved by
David Kaplan in 1965. Of course, this result only holds in a bivalent context, hence the possibility
for Belnap’s trivalent semantics of conditionals.
13Even elaborate dynamic accounts such as Gillies (2010) are not obviously capable of treating
adverbs of quantification, as Khoo (2011) argues.
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Uniformity
Semantic theories aim to be simple. Thus, in general, we should try to posit a
non-ambiguous, simple meaning for ‘if’, as ambiguities add to the complexity of our
semantic theories. Given that the restrictor analysis seems necessary for examples of
conditionals under adverbs of quantification like (4), all else equal, we should apply
it as widely as possible.
Kratzer (1981, 1986) and Heim (1982) showed the analysis can be expanded
very widely. Kratzer noted that the analysis works well for conditionals that are
embedded under various modal constructions. For instance, the analysis is easily
extended to this set of examples:
(7) a. Necessarily, if Mary is here, she is angry.
b. Probably, if Mary is here, she is angry.
c. It’s likely that if Mary is here, she is angry.
d. If Mary is here, she must be angry.
In all these cases it is natural to see the modals ‘probably’, ‘necessarily’, ‘it is likely’,
ands ‘must’ as quantifiers over possible worlds that are restricted by the ‘if’ clause.14
So, if we treat modals as binary quantifiers we can give the basic semantic structure
of the sentences in (7) as in (8).15,16
(8) a. necessarily [Mary is here][Mary is angry]
14Of course, ‘probably’ isn’t a normal quantifier over worlds, but rather one that depends on a
probability measure over the worlds (see Yalcin, 2010, for discussion).
15I am assuming here that we assign suitable semantic values to the modal quantifiers, e.g.
‘necessary’ is a binary quantifier taking two sentences, a restrictor and a matrix, such that ‘nec-
essary[restrictor][matrix] is true iff in every world in which the restrictor is true, the matrix is
true.
16I’m only using the idea that modals are binary quantifiers as one illustrative way of doing
the syntax and semantics here, as I mentioned in the previous section, we could instead treat the
modals as unary operators that are modified by ‘if’-clauses. The relevant point here is that the
‘if’-clause has a semantic value of its own that serves to restrict the modal operator, rather than
combining directly with the consequent.
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b. probably [Mary is here][Mary is angry]
c. it’s likely [Mary is here][Mary is angry]
d. must [Mary is here][Mary is angry]
Kratzer, more controversially, argued that even in conditionals without explicit
modal operators there are implicit modal operators. In particular, Kratzer argues
that a bare indicative conditional—i.e. a conditional sentence without a higher
modal operator, such as (9-a)—includes a silent necessity operator similar to ‘must’
or ‘necessarily’. Thus, the semantic structure of (9-a) can be represented in (9-b)
(9) a. If Mary is here, she is angry.
b. Must [Mary is here] [She is angry]
While the syntax and motivation of this view is novel, it follows in a long tradition
of viewing bare conditionals as expressing a form of conditional necessity. So, in
terms of its sentential semantics, it is a familiar view of bare indicative conditionals.
I should note that this is not the only theoretical option for treating conditionals
without overt quantifiers. Another kind of view assumes that the conditional ex-
pression (i.e. a bare conditional with both antecedent and consequent, like (9-a)) has
some semantic value X. When a binary quantifier, like ‘necessarily’, applies to X we
get restricted quantification. Our semantics, though, also assigns an interpretation
to X of some sort when there is no syntactically present quantifier. An instance
of this kind of view, perhaps the most minimal implementation, is Belnap’s (1970)
trivalent view, which I turn to in the next section.17 What differentiates this type
of view from the traditional Kratzer/Lewis view is that it assigns a single syntac-
tic entity to the conditional expression ‘if Mary is here, she is angry’, rather than
splitting it into two distinct entities. For this reason this view is not compatible
17Lewis (1975) discusses this as a possible treatment of adverbs of quantification. In the context
of probability operators the view can be found originally in de Finetti (1936). See Huitink (2008);
Rothschild (forthcominga) for further discussion of the trivalent view from a linguistic perspective.
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with the syntactic construal of the restrictor hypothesis: ‘if’ has a semantic value
here, it doesn’t just mark a syntactic place. However, when bare conditionals are
embedded under quantifiers the results are equivalent to the syntactic construal: the
antecedent restricts the quantifier.
So it is feasible (in more than one way) to give a unified analysis of bare con-
ditionals and conditionals under adverbs of quantification and modal operators.
Methodological considerations strongly support a unified analysis.
Restrictor-based theories
I argued above that the most promising account of the meaning of the word ‘if’ is
that it serves to mark the material after it as restricting some sort of quantification.
This view usually does not even get mentioned in standard philosophical discussions
of conditionals (e.g. Bennett, 2003; Edgington, 1995). There is a good reason for
this: philosophical views focus on unembedded conditionals without explicit modal
operators:
(10) If Mary is here, she is angry.
Bare conditionals are obviously the toughest cases for the restrictor analysis since
there is no explicit operator for the ‘if’-clause to restrict. When focusing on exam-
ples like (10) the restrictor analysis is unintutive. Nonetheless, as I argued above,
the restrictor analysis is the only game in town for examples like (4), and is both
unintuitive and bad methodologically to treat the ‘if’ in (10) as different from the
‘if’ in (4). So philosophers, if they are seriously interested in the word ‘if’, should
presumably adopt as one of the most plausible hypotheses that ‘if’ in (10) is doing
what it is doing in cases with adverbs of quantification. Since they generally do not
do this, we might be tempted to dismiss philosophical theories as implausible.
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Instead, I suggest we understand the major philosophical theories of conditionals
as views about the semantic value of entire sentences with conditionals and views
about which speech-acts are associated with such sentences. When viewed in this
way the restrictor view of ‘if’ poses no challenge to the philosophical theories, since
they are, as such, compatible with the restrictor view.18
Strict Conditional
Kratzer and Heim’s view is that a bare indicative conditional such as (10) contains
an implicit modal operator. So the logical form of (10) is something more like this:
(11) necessarily [Mary is here][she is angry]
As I noted above, this amounts to the view that bare conditionals express conditional
necessity: in all worlds in which Mary is here, she is angry.19 So the restrictor view
is obviously compatible with the strict conditional view, once we understand that
as a view about bare conditional sentences rather than a view about the connective
‘if’.
Material conditional
We can get the material conditional as a sort of limiting case of the strict con-
ditional. Simply assume the necessity modal only quantifies over worlds that are
actual. Since there is only one, the one question is whether the consequent is true
at that world if the antecedent is. If the antecedent is not true at the actual world,
the quantification is vacuous and so the sentence is true. Thus we get the truth-
18Kratzer, herself, made this point with respect to most of the propositional views of conditionals,
my main contribution here is to extend this point to non-propositional views of conditionals.
19It is widely recognized that this view is only plausible if we view the necessity operator as
quantifying over a sharply restricted set of worlds (rather than, say, all metaphysically or physically
possible worlds). However, in natural language semantics it is normal to think that all quantifiers
are sharply restricted by context, so this does not seem like a problematic discussion.
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conditions of the material conditional. Of course, it is widely acknowledged that
the material-conditional view is hopelessly implausible as a semantics for the condi-
tional: it simply does not account for much basic data about truth-value judgments
of conditionals.20 Nonetheless, it is useful to see that the material conditional view,
as a view about the semantics of bare conditional sentences, is not ruled about the
restrictor view alone.
Stalnaker/Lewis conditionals
Stalnaker and Lewis propose that to evaluate conditionals one needs to look at the
‘closest’ possible worlds in which the antecedent is true.21 Kratzer implements the
variably strict semantics for conditionals within her general approach to modality:
all modals introduce both a base (a set of worlds) and an ordering on those worlds.
‘If’-clauses are still simply restrictors, but the modals do the work of ensuring that
the worlds where the consequent are evaluated are the ‘closest’ worlds.22
Non-propositional
The compatibility of the view of ‘if’-clauses as restrictors with the major propo-
sitional views of conditionals was emphasized by Kratzer. However, there is lit-
tle discussion in the semantics literature of the relationship of non-propositional
views of indicative conditionals to the restrictor view, despite the prominence of
non-propositional views in the philosophical literature. There are a variety of non-
propositional views that accord with the restrictor hypothesis. I will discuss two
20I think the assumption that all indicative conditionals with false antecedents are true flies in
the face of many of our truth-value intuitions, and no amount of pragmatics can explain this fact
away.
21Lewis, of course, only thought this view should be used for counterfactual conditionals, while
Stalnaker thought it should apply to all uses of conditionals.
22Kratzer (1981) provides a battery of arguments that modals themselves need ordering (see
Swanson, 2008, for critical review). Lewis (1981) proved the equivalence between the structure of
Kratzer’s semantics and his own.
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such views here: a trivalent view and a view that combines a non-propositional se-
mantics for epistemic modals with the restrictor view of ‘if’. Before doing so, I will
make some general comments about non-propositional views of conditionals.
It is often at least implicitly assumed that non-propositional views of conditionals
are premised upon a rejection of the project of formal semantics at least insofar as
it extends to include conditionals. This is a mistake.
It is true that the standard assumption underpinning almost all work in semantics
is that when the semantic value of a sentence is a proposition then an assertion of
the sentence is an assertion of that proposition and belief in the sentence is belief in
that proposition. If sentences do not have propositions as semantic values, however,
that does not mean we cannot do semantics. What we need, in this case, is new
bridging principles connecting non-propositional semantic values with assertion and
belief. The semantics in combination with these principles then makes predictions
about what people can do with the relevant sentences. Even orthodox semantic
views sometimes use non-propositional semantic values for complete sentences and,
associated with them, non-standard bridging principles. As I mentioned earlier, a
salient example where orthodox theories need such non-standard bridging principles
is the semantics of questions. Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), for instance, assign
questions partitions of logic space as their semantic value. Asking a question, is
inquiring which cell of the partition the actual world lies in. Wondering about a
question is wondering which cell the actual world is in. With this class of semantic
values and bridging principles we can then judge whether certain assignments of
semantic values are reasonable or not.
Non-truth-conditional programs about conditionals are not generally put forward
as full-fledged semantic theories with explicit semantic values and bridging princi-
ples. This is often taken (by semanticists and linguistically-inclined philosophers of
language) as an implicit rejection of the methodology of semantics. This does not
seem fair to me. As I understand Edgington’s (1995; 2008) view, she is not commit-
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ted to a particular account of the semantic value of conditional sentences. What she
pushes is primarily the negative claim that conditionals do not have propositions
as their semantic values. This is an important claim for the non-propositional view
since if conditionals did have propositions as their semantic values we would expect
the normal bridging principles to kick in so that assertions of conditionals would
simply be assertions of propositions.
For any given claim about what belief and assertion of conditional sentences
amounts to, there will be a host of different combinations of semantic values and
bridging principles that support that claim. So it is not obvious why you should
choose one particular combination; if your main aim is to say what assertions of
conditionals and belief in conditionals amount to, then it may be wise to remain
neutral on which semantic values and bridging principles you think are correct. This
is not to say that giving semantic values and bridging principles for conditionals is
not an interesting project for those sympathetic to the non-propositional view, it is
just to say that not everyone who argues for the non-propositional view needs to
engage in it.
Nonetheless, if we are going to show that non-propositional views are compatible
with the restrictor view we need to sketch how. This is what I turn to now with
two different non-propositional semantics for conditionals, a trivalent account and
a covert modal account.
Trivalent
Belnap (1970) gives a trivalent semantics for conditionals and a semantics for quan-
tifiers that allows quantifiers to take trivalent formulas as their sole argument. The
trivalent semantics is the usual one: A→ C has the truth value of C when A is true
and otherwise is undefined.23 If there is an open variable, x, in A→ C then we can
23There are a number of different options for what to do when A or C is undefined, but these
aren’t relevant here.
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quantify over conditionals with quantifiers defined like this:
(12) Mostx φ is true iff for most objects o s.t. φx→o is defined, φx→o is true.
The technical point is that a trivalent conditional can encode both the restriction
(i.e. where it is defined) and the truth values when the restriction is satisfied. So,
it is possible to get a unary quantifier that takes a single trivalent formula that is
equivalent to a restrictive binary quantifier that takes two bivalent formulas.
Since trivalent formulas do not correspond to ordinary propositions, they can act
as a plausible semantic value of an indicative conditional for a non-propositional
account.24 There is no need to posit a covert modal operator for bare indicative
conditionals, then. The trivalent semantic value still leaves open what personal-
level account we give of conditionals; that depends on what bridging principles we
use. The trivalent semantics is compatible, for instance, with Edgington’s view of
assertion of conditionals as suppositional/conditional assertion.25
Let me illustrate these points by going through a simple example. Take the
sentence ‘If Mary is here, she is angry.’ On the trivalent view this has as its semantic
value something that is true in worlds in which Mary is here and she is angry, false in
which Mary is here and she is not angry, and undefined in worlds in which Mary is not
here. Suppose we take as basic the notions of conditional assertion and conditional
belief, as Edgington seems to. Then our bridging principles for assertions and belief
can be stated as follows: if φ has a trivalent semantic value, then 1) an assertion of
φ is a conditional assertion of the proposition that φ is true given that φ is defined
and, 2) a belief in φ is a conditional belief that φ is true, given that φ is defined.26
24Of course, this is a terminological issue: you might think trivalent truth-conditions do corre-
spond to ordinary propositions. However, given the work they do here, that does not seem to be
the right way to divide up the space of possibilities for conditionals.
25The crucial point is that the trivalent semantic value has enough information to both retrieve
the supposition (the worlds where the semantic value is either true or false) and the division of the
supposed worlds into those where the conditional is true and those where it is false.
26It is worth noting these bridging principles do not work well for other proposed instances of
trivalence, such as that arising from vagueness: when I say that someone is tall, I do not assert that
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Non-propositional modals
The trivalent route is not the only non-propositional view of conditionals. Re-
cent work on epistemic modals has resulted in a variety of proposals according to
which sentences with epistemic modals do not express propositions (Yalcin, 2007;
Swanson, 2006). We can combine these non-propositional views of modals with
Kratzer’s hypothesis that bare conditionals contain silent necessity modals to get a
non-propositional view of bare conditionals. This view needs three components:
• syntax/semantics of ‘if’ clauses are restrictors of modals
• silent epistemic necessity modals in indicative conditionals like (10)
• non-propositional semantics for epistemic modals which can allow restrictions
To make the view complete we also need to posit bridging principles between the
non-propositional values for epistemic modals and the personal-level notions relating
to them such as assertion and belief. Yalcin (2007) and Swanson (2006) provide both
of these in their compositional systems.
While Yalcin (2007) does not endorse the restrictor view, the semantic values he
assigns to bare indicative conditionals and epistemic modals are available to someone
with the restrictor view. (I give this variation on Yalcin’s semantics in the second
appendix.)
Conditional Commands
Treating philosophical views of conditionals as theories of the meaning of entire
sentences with bare conditional, can help clarify some issues about conditional com-
he is clearly tall, conditional on him not being a borderline case. An adequate trivalent semantics
for conditionals and vagueness would need somehow to avoid this problem. This relates to the
problems Soames (1989) raised for trivalent accounts of presupposition projection.
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mands. Edgington (2008) makes the following argument against the material con-
ditional account of conditionals:
Conditional commands can [. . . ] be construed as having the force of
a command of the consequent, conditional upon the antecedent’s being
true. The doctor says to the nurse in the emergency ward, “If the pa-
tient is still alive in the morning, change the dressing”. Considered as a
command to make Hook’s conditional true, this is equivalent to “Make it
the case that either the patient is not alive in the morning, or you change
the dressing”. The nurse puts a pillow over the patient’s face and kills
her. On the truth-functional interpretation, the nurse can claim that
he was carrying out the doctor’s order. Extending Jackson’s account to
conditional commands, the doctor said “Make it the case that either the
patient is not alive in the morning, or you change the dressing”, and
indicated that she would still command this if she knew that the patient
would be alive. This doesn’t help. The nurse who kills the patient still
carried out an order. Why should the nurse be concerned with what the
doctor would command in a counterfactual situation?
Edgington is correct to find conditional commands puzzling if we think the material
conditional account [‘Hook’] is correct. However, even an advocate of the material
conditional view of bare conditionals is entitled to a more sophisticated account
of conditional commands if he endorses the restrictor view of ‘if’. The obvious
direction to go is to assume that imperatives include some sort of modal operator,
and that the antecedent in a conditional command restricts this operator. If some
account like this works, then the material conditional as a view about full sentences
is completely compatible with an account of conditional commands that does not
reduce them to material conditionals in the way Edgington suggests.
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The argument from probability and restrictors
So far, we have not seen any serious impact of the semantic insights of Lewis and
Kratzer on the philosophical debate over conditionals, even on the debate between
propositional and non-propositional views. In this section, I want to explore one
way in which the restrictor view can be used to undermine an argument for the
non-propositional view.27
There is a well-known argument that goes from a simple observation about the
probabilities that we assign to conditionals to the view that conditionals do not
express propositions. The observation about the probabilities of conditionals is often
called Adams’ Thesis, the view that the probability of a conditional is its conditional
probability, formally P (A → C) = P (C|A). Suppose we accept Adams’ thesis.
There are a number of simple mathematical results demonstrating that there is no
proposition whose probability satisfies Adams’ thesis. These results always depend
on auxiliary assumptions of various sorts, but there is a wide-literature suggesting
these assumptions are minimal and plausible.28 So, the argument goes, A → C
cannot be a proposition since there is no proposition that has the same probability
as we think it does.
The restrictor view can undermine this argument for the non-propositional view
by undermining some of the motivation for Adams’ thesis. Recall that according to
Adams’ thesis the probability we assign to an indicative conditional is the probability
of its consequent given its antecedent. One consideration in favor of Adams’ Thesis
goes by way of sentences like (13).
(13) It’s likely that if Mary is here, she is angry.
27Some of the points here can be found in Cozic and E´gre´ (2010) and Rothschild (2013), as well
as in von Fintel’s unpublished lectures (von Fintel, 2007, e.g.).
28This literature begins with Lewis’s (1976) famous triviality results; further stronger results
are discussed in Edgington (1995) and, more formally, in Hajek and Hall (1994). Cozic and E´gre´
(2010) make an important connection between the triviality results and the limitations of unary
quantification referred to in footnote 12.
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It seems (13) is something we would believe/assert just in case the probability that
we assign to Mary being angry on the condition that she is here is high (say above
.5). How do we explain this fact? Well, Adams’ thesis would explain it nicely:
for on Adams’ thesis whether or not we think an indicative conditional is likely just
depends upon whether or not we think the consequent is likely given the antecedent.
In this way Adams’ thesis explains how we understand sentences like (13), and this
itself is a consideration in favor Adams’ thesis.
The explanatory use of Adams’ thesis above depends on the assumption that (13)
involves an ascription of probability to an indicative conditional. The restrictor
hypothesis, however, would favor a different account of the semantic structure of
(13). On the restrictor hypothesis this is a classic instance in which an ‘if’-clause
restricts a probability operator. The probability judgment is simply a judgment of
the probability of the consequent restricted to the worlds in which the antecedent is
true. Assuming a reasonable semantics of probability operators such as ‘likely’ this
will be true just in case the conditional probability is greater than .5 (see Yalcin,
2010, for a comprehensive discussion of the semantics of probability operators).
To make clear: the reason this strategy is compatible with the rejection of Adams’
thesis is that on this strategy we do not concede that indicative conditionals them-
selves conform to Adams’ thesis. The strategy works rather by denying that our
apparent judgments of the probabilities of conditionals are really judgments of the
probabilities of the propositions expressed by bare conditionals. On Kratzer’s full
view, for instance, indicative conditionals have silent necessity modals and express
propositions.
So, given the restrictor view of ‘if’-clauses, our judgments about sentence like
(13) do not provide support for Adams’ thesis. However, all cases of graded belief
do not involve explicit probability operators. We can simply have a high degree
of confidence in the indicative conditional ‘If Mary is here, she is angry’, without
explicitly saying or thinking (13). Our confidence in a conditional seems to depend
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just on our conditional confidence in the consequent given the antecedent: this is
another piece of evidence in favor of Adams’ thesis. For the restrictor view to
undermine this consideration, more assumptions about how ‘if’ operates need to be
made than are standard in the restrictor literature. In particular, we need to allow
that ‘if’-clauses can act not just to restrict linguistically present modals but also
can restrict aspects of thoughts involving probabilistic belief. This idea has not been
much explored but it seems a promising approach to explain intuitions supporting
Adams’ thesis without actually endorsing Adams’ thesis. Note, however, that if we
follow this strategy, we seem to be already accepting one of the main tenets of the
non-propositional view: belief in conditionals does not directly target a proposition.
I am not going to argue here that we should reject Adams’ thesis. I just want to
suggest that a case can be made that Adams’ thesis, taken as a thesis about bare in-
dicative conditionals, is an illusion that can be explained away once we acknowledge
that ‘if’-clauses are restrictors.
Embedded Conditionals
Another area where semantic theory connects up with the philosophical debate over
the meaning of conditionals is in the question of how conditionals embed under
quantifiers. So far, we’ve discussed only one way in which conditionals can be em-
bedded: under probability operators, modals and adverbs of quantification. The
restrictor story seems to provide a clear unified analysis of ‘if’ in these embeddings:
the ‘if’-clause serves to restrict the operator. Given that the restrictor view is com-
patible with either propositional or non-propositional accounts of bare conditionals,
these cases do not provide evidence for or against the idea that bare conditionals
express propositions.
There are, however, a variety of constructions in which ‘if’-clauses are embedded
in more complex constructions. It is commonly noted that many embeddings of
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conditionals in complex constructions do not seem interpretable. Sentence (14), as
Gibbard (1981) notes, is not easily comprehensible.
(14) If Kripke was there if Strawson was, then Anscombe was there.
I want to put aside the question of the significance of the fact that many instances
of embedded conditionals like this are hard to understand.29 There are, in any case,
many examples of embedded conditionals which are perfectly easy to understand.
Here are some instances:
Conditionals under conjunction:
(15) If Mary is here then John is here, and John might be here.
Conditionals under disjunction:
(16) Either if Mary is in China then she’s in danger or if Mary is in India then
she’s in danger.
Conditionals under quantifiers (Higginbotham, 1986):
(17) Some student will fail if he goofs off.
All of these sentences with embedded conditionals are easily comprehensible. I will
focus on the cases of conditionals embedded under quantifiers, such as (17), as it is
perhaps the best studied example.30
Some, such as Ko¨lbel (2000) argue that sentences of the form of (17) provide ev-
29Should we follow Gibbard (1981) and Edgington (1995, 2008) in seeing this as itself evidence for
the non-propositional view? It is not clear to me that we should. After all, if the non-propositional
views need to account for some embeddings, then they would seem also to face the problem of
explaining the lack of generality. Of course, if they had a predictive theory about when exactly
embeddings were acceptable, that could be an advantage, but I know of no such theory.
30Conjunctions, in any case, do not present serious problems for any accounts, given that con-
junctions can be paraphrased as consecutive assertions. Disjunctions of conditionals would seem
(from a logical point of view) to present similar issues to those raised by existential quantifiers.
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idence against the non-propositional view. Kolbel argues that the problem embed-
dings of conditionals raise is analogous to the Frege-Geach problem for expressivism.
That problem, generally speaking, is the problem of accounting for how sentences
that do not express propositions function under the standard truth-functional op-
erators (for a recent review see Schroeder, 2008).
Assuming that cases like (17) are genuine cases of conditionals embedded un-
der operators, nothing prevents the non-propositional approaches from giving ex-
tended semantics for the relevant operators to try to cover these cases. The non-
propositional approach assigns non-propositional semantic values to conditionals, so
all that is needed is to expand the meaning of the quantifiers to allow embeddings
of non-propositional values. Of course, doing so requires a number of theoretical
choices, in particular the assignment of particular semantic values to conditionals.
Swanson (2006) aims to give exactly such an account of examples like (17) as well as
other embeddings. An important point here is that it is already standard practice
in linguistics to allow basic logical operators to operate on a range of different types
of semantic values, so that extending the meaning of the quantifiers and logical
connectives is by no means unorthodox, if done in a principled and systematic way
(Partee and Rooth, 1983; Partee, 1995).31
One theoretical option for treating quantified conditionals, available to propo-
sitional or non-propositional theorists who endorse the restrictor view, is to see
‘if’-clauses as directly restricting nominal quantifiers. Supporting this view is the
seeming equivalence of the following two sentences (as noted by Higginbotham,
1986):
31In Yalcin’s (2007) semantics for instance, the non-propositional nature comes in only through
the interpretation of an index of evaluation. Thus, on his account we can simply use the off-the-
shelf interpretation of all logical operators and get a complete semantic system. The interesting
questions is whether the semantic values we get when we do this, combined with the relevant
bridging principles, provides a plausible account of the constructions. Klinedinst and Rothschild
(2012) give cases where they do not and propose some fixes.
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(18) a. Every student passed the exam if he tried.
b. Every student who tried passed the exam.
This equivalence would be neatly explained by positing that ‘if he tried’ simply
restricts the nominal quantificational phrase ‘every student’. For then the logical
form of (18-a) would be as in (19), which is clearly equivalent to (18-b).
(19) Every [student & tried] [passed the exam]
This option has been explored recently (von Fintel, 1998; Leslie, 2009). However
a systematic examination of cases suggests that we cannot hold that generally ‘if’-
clauses can restrict nominal quantifiers. If they could, we would expect (17) to have
a reading on which it is equivalent to (20)
(20) Some student who goofs off will fail.
It does not, however, which should make us suspicious of the idea that ‘if’-clauses
really can restrict nominal quantifiers such as ‘every’ and ‘no’. For this and other
reasons, the leading consensus is that accounting for the equivalence of (18-a) and
(18-b) by appeal to the idea that ‘if’-clauses restrict nominal quantifier is wrong
(von Fintel and Iatridou, 2002; Huitink, 2010; Klinedinst, 2011).
Since direct restriction is not an option, embedded conditionals under quanti-
fiers provide serious challenges for any semantic account of conditionals. It is not
sufficient to merely assign some semantic value to embedded conditionals. We also
want the semantic value assigned to match our judgments about what the sentence
means. For instance, the material conditional view allows us to assign propositions
to the embedded conditionals in (15)–(17), but no matter how we construe the logi-
cal form of these sentences it does not seem like we will get the right truth-conditions
for these sentences.32
32For this reason I share with Edgington (1995) perplexity over why the existence of embeddings
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Nonetheless a serious effort has been made to show that the strict-conditional
view (or a variably-strict view) gives adequate truth conditions for most instances
of quantified conditionals. von Fintel and Iatridou (2002); Klinedinst (2011) show
that a strict/variable strict conditional account can explain subtle facts about the
meaning of quantified conditionals, such as the seeming equivalence between (21-a)
and (21-b).
(21) a. No student will pass if he goofs off.
b. Every student will fail if he goofs off.
The basic idea is that the logical form of both sentences involves the embedding of
a bare conditional in the matrix clause of the quantifier as follows:
(22) a. No [student x] [if x goofs off, x will pass].
b. Every [student x][if x goofs off, x will fail].
If we now assume that the conditional excluded middle holds, i.e. in every case
either A→ C is true or A→ ¬C is true, then the equivalence of (21-a) and (21-b)
follows immediately. What is important to note is that this explanation of what
is going on with the sentences such as (21-a) and (21-b) depends on conditionals
expressing truth-valued propositions. At this point, then, propositional views would
seem to have an advantage in treating quantified conditionals, but this is perhaps
just a result of the fact that propositional theorists have worked more seriously on
quantified conditionals than non-propositional theorists have.
Let me strengthen the consideration above by giving another case for which
handling an embedded conditional is tractable on a propositional view but does not
seem to be so on a non-propositional view. Consider the sentence (23) in which a
quantified conditional is embedded under probability operator.
is so often used to argue for the material conditional account.
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(23) It’s likely that some student will pass if he tries.
Focus on the reading of this sentence in which it means that there is a high chance
that at least one student is such that were he to take the exam he would pass.
How do we capture this reading in our semantics? We cannot view this sentence as
one where the probability operator ‘it’s likely’ is restricted by the ‘if’-clause. For
(23) is not equivalent to either of the two readings which we can get if we restrict
the probability operator by the ‘if’-clause (the two readings depend on the scope of
‘some’).
(24) The conditional probability that a student will pass, given that some student
takes the test is high.
(25) There is some student x such the conditional probability that x will pass
given that x takes the test is high.
For (24) requires that there actually be a high chance that if any students take the
test one student will pass, which is not the intended reading (for it might be unlikely
that the one student who would pass were he to take the test will actually take it).
On the other hand, (25) requires that we be certain that there is one student who
will likely pass if he takes the test, which is also not the intended reading. It seems
safe to say, then, that we cannot explain the natural reading of (23) by allowing the
‘if’ to restrict ‘it’s likely’.
A natural explanation of what is going in (23) is as follow:
For every student x there is a proposition expressed by the sentence ‘if x
tries, he will pass’. (23) is true just in case it is likely that one of those
propositions is true.
If we accept this explanation, however we are accepting that there is some proposition
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corresponding to the sentence ‘if x tries, he will pass’ for each x.33 We need a propo-
sition here because propositions are the sorts of thing we can assign probabilities
to. If we accept that bare indicative conditionals (when embedded) can sometimes
express propositions, then we have already rejected the non-propositional view in
some cases.34
Conclusion
My goal in this paper was to relate the philosophical debate over conditionals to
the linguistic literature on conditionals. In philosophy non-propositional views are
both widely accepted and widely viewed with suspicion as being incompatible with
the project of formal semantics. I argued here that we should not be so suspicious
of non-propositional views, but I also suggested some challenges the views face.35
Appendix 1: Restrictor semantics
This is a a simple syntactic variant of the restrictor view. It is meant to cover con-
ditionals under adverbs of quantification, modals, and bare conditionals. We have
two classes of expressions: sentences, which are true or false relative to situations
(which can be actual or possible), and situational quantifiers (including modals),
which are binary quantifiers taking a restrictor sentence and a matrix sentence.
First, the semantic rules for sentences:
33On the restrictor view we might get that proposition by restricting ‘will’ (or a silent necessity
modal) in ‘if x takes the test he will pass’. The point I am making here is that the result of this
process still yields a proposition which we can assign a probability to. This is exactly what the
non-propositional view of bare conditionals seeks to deny.
34For one of the only attempts to deal with this general kind of example from a non-propositional
perspective see Moss (forthcoming).
35This note is intended as a supplement to, rather than a review of, the debate between propo-
sitional and non-propositional views, and so I have not discussed many crucial issues such as the
alleged subjectivity of conditionals. I discuss this and related issues in Rothschild (forthcomingb).
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(26) [[ Mary is here ]]s is true iff Mary is here in situation s
(27) [[ Mary is angry ]]s is true iff Mary is angry in situation s
Now, the semantic rules for the situational quantifiers:
(28) [[ usually [φ][ψ] ]]s is true iff in the world of s most situations, s′, in which
[[φ]]s
′
is true are situations in which [[ψ]]s
′
is true.
(29) [[ necessarily [φ][ψ] ]]s is true iff for all epistemically-possible-in-s-situations,
s′, if [[φ]]s
′
is true then [[ψ]]s
′
is true.
This is our basic semantics. Now we need to give our syntactic construal rules, which
allow us to handle sentences that include ‘if’ (which is itself not interpreted). For
these rules we need a special tautological sentence T . Let Q be one of the situational
quantifiers. Let φ and ψ be sentences without ‘if’ appearing in them. The syntactic
construal rules are as follows:
(30) Qφ =⇒ Q[T ][φ]
This rule tell us that if a non-conditional sentence is embedded under an adverb of
quantification, then it goes into the matrix of the adverb of quantification and the
restrictor is vacuous, i.e. it is T .36
(31) Q if φ, ψ =⇒ Q[φ][ψ]
This rule tells us that if an adverb of quantification heads a conditional, then the
antecedent becomes the restrictor and the consequent becomes the matrix.
(32) if φ, ψ =⇒ necessarily if φ, ψ
36See von Fintel (1994b, 1995) for discussion of pragmatic restrictions of adverbs of quantifica-
tion.
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This rule adds a a silent necessity modal to a bare conditional.
On these rules then sentence (33), by rules (31) and (32), is transformed into
(34), which is true iff all epistemically-possible-in-s situations in which Mary is here
are ones in which she is angry, which is a standard strict conditional.
(33) [[ if Mary is here, she is angry ]]s .
(34) [[ Necessarily [Mary is here][Mary is angry] ]]s
Appendix 2: Non-propositional modal restrictor
semantics
This is a simple modification of the above semantics to yield Yalcin’s (2007) non-
propositional view of conditionals.
Following Yalcin we add an extra index i, which is an information parameter,
and has as its values sets of situations.37 We consider sentences that express truth or
falsity in a way that is sensitive to the information parameter to be non-propositional
(see Yalcin, 2007, for discussion).
Syntactic construal rules are the same as before, as are all truth definitions,
except that for necessarily. The new entry for necessarily (which is understood as
an epistemic modal) is as follows:
(35) [[ necessarily [φ][ψ] ]]s,i if for all situations s′ in i in which [[φ]]s
′,i is true,
[[ψ]]s
′,i is true.
We now need a bridging principles for sentences whose truth is sensitive to i, such as
sentences that include necessarily. The principle we will give, (36), takes sentences
as recommendations to update one’s belief states to make the sentence true if one’s
37Yalcin uses worlds, not situations. I do not do this here to emphasize the parallels with adverbs
of quantification.
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belief state is used to select i:
(36) If an assertion of a sentence φ is made and φ is sensitive to i then that as-
sertion should be understood as a recommendation to conform one’s beliefs
to the constraint: if b = set of all situations worlds possible according to
one’s belief state, then for all s in b, [[φ]]s,b is true.
Consider:
(37) [[ if Mary is here, she is angry ]]s,i
By the syntactic construal rules this comes out as follows:
(38) [[ Necessarily [Mary is here][Mary is angry] ]]s,i
This is true iff all situations s in i in which Mary is here are situations in which Mary
is angry. Since it is sensitive to the information parameter, it is non-propositional.38
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